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INNOVATION STRATEGIES FOR 
DEFENCE
THE SUCCESSFUL CASE OF DEFENCE MEDICAL 
SERVICES
MATTHEW FORD, TIMOTHY HODGETTS AND DAVID WILLIAMS
Over the past 20 years, the Defence Medical Services (DMS, the umbrella organisaion for 
medical provision within the Briish armed forces) has been innovaing consistently and at 
pace within the Ministry of Defence. The result of this sustained efort has led to progressive 
improvement in the outcomes of the criically injured. Separately, it has also led to global 
transformaional innovaion in support of the response to the Ebola epidemic in Sierra 
Leone. Through planned and orchestrated intervenions across the enire organisaion, from 
leadership to technology, medical pracices to training and organisaional design, the DMS 
can legiimately claim to have achieved a ‘Revoluion in Military Medical Afairs’. Mathew 
Ford, Timothy Hodgets and David Williams examine the innovaion lifecycle within the DMS 
as it deines its response to the challenges of the changing character of conlict and consider 
the way defence medicine is an example to the wider military.
I
n September 2015, General Nicholas 
Houghton, then Chief of the Defence 
Staf, made a number of observaions 
about the future of global security. 
Prominent in his list of seven themes 
were the constant challenge produced 
out of uncertainty and the growing rise 
of instability and threat diversiicaion. 
As far as he was concerned, the quesion 
was clear: how could the UK match 
its limited capabiliies to the muliple 
demands produced by a changing 
security environment?1
The government’s response came 
in November 2015 with the publicaion 
of the Naional Security Strategy and 
Strategic Defence and Security Review 
2015 (SDSR).2 Taking a diferent line 
to previous reviews, this SDSR made 
innovaion a key focal point in the 
efort to manage contemporary security 
concerns. Developing innovaive products 
and services, the SDSR observed, is 
vital for maintaining an advantage over 
adversaries. However, more than this, 
innovaion helps to inluence industrial 
and strategic partners and, at the same 
ime, promote naional prosperity.
In many respects, the government’s 
pronouncements on innovaion mirror 
those of the US Department of Defense’s 
third ofset strategy.3 Like the US strategy, 
the SDSR seeks to re-fashion and apply 
commercial pracices and of-the-shelf 
technologies for military technical 
advantage, not just for today but in 
preparaion for future threats. For the 
UK, just like its transatlanic counterparts, 
this recognises that the ‘private sector, 
not governments’ now drives the pace 
of technological change.4 This not only 
relects iscal realiies, but also the fact 
that the private sector is now invesing 
more in research and development than 
the public sector. In 2014, for instance, the 
top 20 global companies had a combined 
research and development budget of more 
than £100 billion.5 With the private sector 
shouldering the burden of the global 
research efort, the Ministry of Defence 
(MoD) needs to ind ways to redirect 
and leverage these investments through 
partnering with industry. Thus the SDSR 
focuses on Defence Growth Partnerships 
and Security and Resilience Growth 
Partnerships with the intenion of bringing 
together the UK’s universiies, small and 
medium-sized enterprises and start-ups 
to develop collaboraive and commercially 
aware approaches to risk, investment 
planning and project management.
When it comes to delivering on the 
ambiions set out in the SDSR, however, 
there is sill a great deal that needs to be 
deined. This includes: how to transform 
military organisaions; how to embed 
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and sustain public sector transformaion 
through harnessing private sector 
investments; and how to deliver soluions 
that produce more than short-term and 
costly technology adaptaions. The task 
of this aricle is, therefore, to sketch out 
how an innovaion strategy might be 
operaionalised so that the MoD might 
opimise its investment decisions. In this 
respect, the aricle considers the experience 
of the Defence Medical Services (DMS) 
and atempts to show how successful 
innovaion might be more widely exploited 
in a Briish military context.
Defence Medical Services: Long-
Term Innovaion Enables Short-
Term Adaptaion
The DMS has achieved outstanding 
clinical results which some have described 
as consituing a ‘Revoluion in Medical 
Military Afairs’.6 Not only have these 
successes sustained the moral component, 
further enabling momentum on the 
batleield, they have also underlined 
the government’s commitment to the 
Armed Forces Covenant.7 Despite the 
increasing severity of wounds over 
the course of the Helmand campaign, 
the unexpected survival rate signiicantly 
surpassed that of the Naional Health 
Service (NHS). As a result, soldiers and 
their commanders understood that if they 
‘got into trouble’ everything that could 
be done to guarantee their survival and 
future welfare was being done.8
However, achieving these successes 
has been hard won. Only through 20 years 
of coninual performance improvement 
at all levels of the organisaion, spanning 
technology to governance, has the DMS 
put itself at the forefront of clinical results 
both in terms of military and civilian 
medical pracice. Indeed, it was stated 
by the Healthcare Commission, one of 
the three organisaions that make up the 
Care Quality Commission, that there is 
much the NHS can learn from the DMS.9 
Key to this has been the balancing of 
long-term innovaion cycles against the 
demands produced by rapid deployment 
and the requirement to adapt to the 
changing operaing environment. 
No greater example has been the 
innovaions in organisaion, technology, 
training and clinical pracice to support 
the transformaion of a ield hospital to 
manage Ebola paients in Sierra Leone.10
In terms of batleield success, the 
foundaion for the DMS’s Operaional 
Paient Care Pathway is based on three 
mutually supporing pillars.11 In the irst 
instance, there has been a conceptual 
revoluion in paient care. Central to this 
was the recogniion that catastrophic 
haemorrhage from limbs has been a 
major cause of avoidable death on the 
batleield.12 Establishing the evidenial 
base in support of this conclusion has 
taken ime and scruiny of historical 
conlicts. The new concept meant breaking 
away from established civilian pracice 
of trauma care that emphasised ‘airway, 
breathing and circulaion’. Making this 
change was disrupive and was met with 
Naval Nurse Sarah Butler and Medical Assistant Georgina Francis treat an injured soldier at Camp Basion’s ield hospital in Helmand province, Afghanistan, February 
2009. Courtesy of PA Images/Kaie Dawson
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internal resistance.13 Having made the 
conceptual break, a number of doctrinal, 
organisaional and training challenges 
needed to be overcome. Advances in 
pre-hospital emergency care capability 
were needed to ensure that the casualty 
made it from the batleield to the ield 
hospital alive. In Afghanistan, the most 
tangible signs of these changes were 
the irst aid equipment carried by every 
soldier, the introducion of the army team 
medic and enhancements to the airborne 
Medical Emergency Response Team 
(MERT) to secure and stabilise the casualty 
as they made their way to Camp Basion.
MERTs and batleield medics by 
themselves do not represent paricularly 
revoluionary pracices. The concept 
of bringing emergency medicine to the 
front line had precedents in the Incident 
Response Teams of the 1990s.14 Batleield 
medics had antecedents in the ‘buddy 
system’ developed by US Special Forces 
in Vietnam.15 When reimagined through 
the lens of catastrophic haemorrhage, 
however, prevenion of blood loss became 
the driving concern for those involved 
in pre-hospital care. New technologies 
that prevented blood loss could be put 
into service. Old technologies, some of 
which had previously been dismissed as 
counterproducive, could be reconsidered. 
Thus, even as batleield medics and MERT 
personnel made greater use of pelvic 
binders and compression and haemostaic 
dressings, older, more soldier-proof 
technologies such as tourniquets, could 
be used in the knowledge that this would 
increase survival.
Enabling the conceptual revoluions 
nevertheless depended on clinical doctrine, 
the second pillar of the Operaional 
Paient Care Pathway. In this respect, a 
key enabler for change – one based on a 
much longer innovaion trajectory – was 
the work of then Colonel Ian Haywood, 
who in the late 1980s developed a 
military equivalent to civilian Advanced 
Trauma Life Support pracices.16 It was 
iniially known as Briish Army Advanced 
Trauma Life Support but then became 
known as Batleield Advanced Trauma 
Life Support (BATLS) when medicine 
became a concern for all branches of 
the armed forces. BATLS codiied trauma 
care, repeatedly demonstraing its value 
in Operaion Granby – the name given to 
Briish military operaions in the 1991 Gulf 
War – and during mass casualty situaions 
in the Balkan conlicts.17 BATLS provided 
a framework for thinking about trauma 
care from batleield to ield hospital, 
retaining its use even as various aspects 
evolved due to a changing approach to 
haemorrhage.18
If BATLS provided a common 
language for thinking through the military 
response to trauma, then it took the inal 
pillar of the Operaional Paient Care 
Pathway to provide the means through 
which transformaive change was made 
possible. Here, the challenges were 
concerned with organisaion, medical 
governance and technology. As discussed 
below, some of these changes were 
imposed from outside the DMS, some 
were a response to budgetary pressures 
and others came from an efort to 
opimise performance.
In the irst instance, the Strategic 
Defence Review 1998 reorganised the 
DMS, further centralising and integraing 
the single service medical components 
under the surgeon general.19 At the end 
of the Cold War there were fourteen 
Briish military hospitals dispersed across 
the country and each of the services had 
separate centres of academia and clinical 
excellence. The peace dividend cuts 
of 1994 forced a rethink and led to the 
closure of all but one military hospital and 
the dispersal of military clinicians to ive 
NHS hospitals. By 1997, the Defence Select 
Commitee was quesioning whether 
the DMS could coninue to exist.20 In 
response, the DMS decided to more 
acively partner with the NHS and open a 
centre of academic and military medicine 
at what would become the Royal Centre 
for Defence Medicine (RCDM) at the 
Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham. 
Originally, the RCDM was at Selly Oak NHS 
Trust Hospital, where it oicially opened 
in 2001. Although there were iniial 
problems managing military personnel 
within an NHS context, these challenges 
were overcome. The net efect of these 
reforms did not produce what some 
theorists of military-technical change 
someimes characterise as either top-
down or botom-up innovaion. Instead, 
they resulted in the RCDM generaing 
the experise to drive change in military 
medicine from the middle out.21
In terms of clinical governance, the 
need to use the RCDM to insituionalise 
change was brought to a head in 2003. 
During a class acion brought by nearly 
2,000 former Briish military personnel 
sufering from post-traumaic stress 
disorder, the High Court judge, Jusice 
Owen, quesioned whether the DMS 
had been negligent in keeping abreast 
of the developing state of knowledge in 
psychiatric care.22 Although the case was 
eventually dismissed, the censure led 
to the implementaion of new naional 
clinical guidelines underpinned by 
technologies that enabled the efecive 
collecion and analysis of medical data 
through the much expanded Military 
Trauma Registry. The goal was to 
implement a clinical governance model 
that emphasised quality assurance.23 This 
in turn was supported by the greater use 
of a peer-review framework established 
at the RCDM designed to evaluate the 
number and reasons for unexpected 
survival and to analyse every operaional 
trauma death. In the process, the RCDM 
became the fulcrum around which a 
shared DMS culture could establish itself. 
This culture was tolerant of and founded 
on a systemaic and construcive process 
of rigorous self-criicism and analysis.
These long-term innovaions ensured 
that the DMS was ready to ield medical 
personnel to Afghanistan and Iraq. More 
than this, however, these changes produced 
a degree of organisaional resilience that 
made it possible for the DMS to rapidly 
respond, test and disseminate change and 
adapt to the necessiies produced out of 
batle. Thus by 2007, Joint Theatre Clinical 
Case Conferences oversaw a revised and 
expanded Joint Theatre Trauma Registry, 
which made it possible for rear-echelon 
and in-theatre medical praciioners to 
coordinate their treatment plans, ensuring 
that clinician decision-making and casualty 
informaion were in lockstep as wounded 
soldiers were taken from the batleield 
to treatment in Birmingham.24 When 
supported by peer review and analysis 
undertaken at the RCDM, decisions taken 
in ield hospitals could be assessed and 
further opimisaions and intervenions 
made. By 2009, it became clear that 
the managerial burden produced by the 
changes to medical doctrine concerning 
damage control resuscitaion,25 rapid 
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evacuaion, aeromedical transportaion 
home (C17A Globemasters equipped as 
lying hospitals) and working within an 
inter-disciplinary and internaional military 
context was too great. Consequently, 
the DMS deployed a medical director to 
Camp Basion so that the clinical director 
could remain focused on paient care 
and maintaining quality assurance.26 
Further insituionalised through military 
operaional support training and hospital 
macro-simulaion exercises, it is only 
Figure 1:  Major Developments in Trauma Care Standards in the DMS and NHS since 1995
Source: Authors’ own work.
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through a combinaion of muliple long-
term and short-term intervenions that 
truly transformaional results have been 
made possible.
Understanding the Need: 
From Adaping to Change to 
Disruping the Organisaion
The DMS has innovated itself by coninually 
invesing in pracices, infrastructure and 
technologies that have the potenial to 
bring long-term beneit in paient care. 
However, not all of these changes have 
necessarily fallen into preplanned paterns 
following centralised direcives. In some 
instances – notably those associated with 
organisaion, clinical governance and 
technology – budgetary pressures and 
grand strategic decision-making disrupted 
exising DMS business. At the same 
ime, batleield experience has ofered 
coninual opportuniies to test, reine, 
improve and reject methods, techniques 
and technologies depending on how 
they afect paient care outcomes. In the 
case of long-term investment, external, 
unplanned and otherwise disrupive 
change has enhanced the capability of the 
DMS through the creaion of the RCDM and 
focusing on quality. In terms of batleield 
necessiies, the prior preparaions put 
in place by the DMS ensured that the 
organisaion could rapidly adapt to the 
immediate and challenging circumstances 
generated by war.
However, it would be inaccurate 
to describe this disrupive change as 
insituionalised within the DMS in a 
similar manner to that advocated for 
commercial organisaions by Clayton M 
Christensen in his work The Innovator’s 
Dilemma.27 Disruping the DMS has not 
been a market-led acivity. Rather, the 
kinds of innovaion this aricle describes 
have been based on changes that have 
been prescribed by and implemented 
through the public sector. Indeed, much 
of the innovaion that has emerged from 
the DMS has depended on enablers that 
have their basis in academic clinicians 
whose defence medical professorships 
are rooted in their NHS pracices.
The kinds of disrupive change 
this aricle discusses, therefore, need 
some further explanaion if a case is 
to be made for inding ways to embed 
processes of innovaion within the DMS 
such that the organisaion can coninue its 
transformaion trajectory. In this respect, 
the authors assert that the ability of the 
DMS to prepare for future conlicts and 
emergencies will come through harnessing 
the opportuniies that the state can provide 
to the private sector to test and embed 
disrupive innovaion. This approach has 
more in common with the indings of 
Mariana Mazzucato, who observed that 
the public sector has regularly invested in 
ledgling innovaions and in the process 
incubated enirely new markets.28
Thus, the quesion facing the DMS – 
indeed the quesion facing the whole MoD 
– is how to plan for and manage disrupive 
changes even as the organisaion 
opimises its capacity to make adaptaions 
in war. All future operaing contexts and 
demands placed on the DMS cannot be 
known, but plans can be devised for the 
kinds of long-term investment that can 
ensure the entrepreneurial state helps 
to sustain adaptaion. Given industry’s 
increasingly large R&D budgets, it is clear 
that rapid experimentaion will be enabled 
through collaboraion with it. Puing 
in place principles of engagement that 
manage the structure of risk and reward 
while resolving procurement and supply 
chain challenges will enhance the DMS’s 
ability to adapt rapidly. Finding ways to 
align DMS requirements with industry’s 
ambiions to develop broad markets 
may involve procurement-linked projects 
under the Small Business Research 
Iniiaive to help jumpstart opportuniies. 
Urgent Operaional Requirements 
(UOR) represent an established route 
for resolving batleield imperaives. 
What this aricle proposes, however, 
are processes and mechanisms that will 
accelerate the development of soluions 
that cannot yet be accommodated by 
the UOR system and cannot be provided 
through the public sector.
To do this efecively, the DMS will 
need to clarify the relaionships it has 
with the NHS to ensure that innovaion in 
defence produces longer-term beneits for 
the public. At the same ime, the UK needs 
to accept that the NHS is not geared up 
to innovate as quickly as the DMS, given 
the complex military and emergency relief 
challenges the military faces and the 
acknowledged role of defence medicine 
as a irst mover in innovaion. The clinical 
demands of defence thus lend themselves 
to working closely with industrial partners 
in new medical technologies, but only 
on the basis that the DMS can deine its 
business requirements clearly. Generaing 
that clarity will demand proper horizon 
scanning, mapping research intervenions 
against potenial payofs for industry 
and the NHS, and aligning innovaion 
with the regulatory regime and ethical 
consideraions that frame research. 
Some of the infrastructure to deliver on 
this agenda is already in place with the 
aggregaion of UK defence medicine 
assets in the Midlands. These assets will be 
further enhanced following the opening 
of the Defence Naional Rehabilitaion 
Centre, on the Stanford Hall estate in 
Stanford-on-Soar near Loughborough, 
in 2018. The DMS now needs to move 
quickly to capitalise on this alignment, 
thereby turning the transformaions of 
the past 20 years into enduring change 
that will beneit defence over the next 
two decades. In paricular, the DMS now 
needs to take the lead and help create a 
med-tech incubator to solve contemporary 
defence medical challenges and at the 
same ime lead the way on med-tech for 
industry and the NHS.
Payofs and Challenges
Sustaining the transformaion in the 
DMS thus depends on muliple value 
proposiions for various consituencies 
and careful capture and communicaion 
of defence medicine requirements. 
Industrial partners need to know that 
their investment will lead to commercially 
viable innovaions. Commanders will 
righfully want to know that their soldiers 
are being properly looked ater. Soldiers 
will want to know that they are not 
just guinea pigs for industry but rather 
the focal point for delivering quality 
healthcare. The country will want to see 
high standards being maintained and 
taxpayers will want to see returns on any 
investment they make. Puing in place a 
carefully managed innovaion incubator 
that delivers on these opportuniies 
will require care, business acumen and 
a great deal of efecive leadership. 
However, the potenial beneits that 
the DMS can generate by working with 
industry warrant the investment of ime 
and energy.
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Challenges to fulilling the potenial 
payofs will nevertheless remain. There 
needs to be a certain degree of realism 
in the way that meaningful innovaion 
challenges are formulated. Technology 
botlenecks need to be accounted for 
and the interfaces between muliple 
disciplines and stakeholders will be 
challenging. Technical issues will demand 
careful tesing and validaion to guarantee 
sponsor engagement. Commercial, clinical 
and military cultures are diferent and 
will consider quesions of risk, certainty 
and resilience diferently. Moreover, 
the private sector, the MoD and the 
armed forces themselves have diferent 
hierarchical structures and aitudes 
towards bureaucracy. The Defence Science 
and Technology Laboratory (Dstl) provides 
a mechanism for reconciling some of the 
challenges a DMS med-tech incubator 
might produce. However, this will be 
possible only if all stakeholders recognise 
the strategic beneits that can be realised 
from everyone working together.
Conclusion
Nicholas Houghton was clear in his 
assessment of the future security 
environment. Threat diversiicaion and 
instability are becoming major challenges 
for the UK and its NATO partners. In 
recognising this broadening of the security 
agenda, the government’s response has 
developed along several axes. For the irst 
ime, however, the SDSR has explicitly 
described innovaion as a central plank in 
the government’s set of policy responses.
This aricle has shown that 
transformaive innovaion within defence 
medicine has been ongoing for some ime 
and with remarkable success. Consequently, 
government policy in relaion to UK defence 
has some foundaion in the successful 
experience of the DMS. Soldier survival 
and unexpected survival rates have been 
well in advance of the NHS to the extent 
that DMS is now recognised to be a centre 
of world-leading trauma-care specialists. 
The DMS is well placed, therefore, to ofer 
the beneits of its innovaion know-how to 
the rest of the MoD.
Nonetheless, the DMS recognises 
that if it is to further embed, sustain 
and take advantage of the propiious 
circumstances it has created for itself, it 
must coninue to embrace the innovaion 
agenda that the government set out. The 
DMS is conident of its ability to embrace 
innovaion as a core consideraion in 
its change agenda and in this respect it 
has already started to deine and put in 
place efecive networks and structures 
to facilitate the creaion of an innovaion 
incubator. This organisaional device will 
allow the public and private sectors to 
share risks and rewards in ways that will 
beneit everyone.
The DMS has already demonstrated 
a degree of entrepreneurialism. Central 
direcives and disrupive challenges have in 
part set the framework for organisaional 
change. However, the energy for steering 
innovaion has been dependent on the 
RCDM and the evidenial base supplied 
by academic clinicians, who have driven 
transformaion from the middle of the 
organisaion. In the future, if the DMS is 
to be ready for everything from Ebola to 
terror atacks, and disaster relief to war, 
then it must further exploit its unique 
capabiliies through investment in new 
and exising partnerships. The potenial 
to deliver signiicant beneits for industry, 
the public good and for soldiers is too 
great an opportunity and ought not to 
be missed. 
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